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Tax Advisor-Client Privileges
A. Background
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
a. Classic "Wigmore" Definition: When (i) legal advice is sought (ii)
from a legal advisor acting as such (iii) the communications
relating to that advice (iv) made in confidence by the client (v) at
the client's insistence are protected from disclosure (vi) by the
client or advisor (vii) unless the privilege is waived.
b. Purpose: The attorney-client privilege is intended to facilitate
sound and comprehensive legal advice by eliminating the incentive
the client would otherwise have to not fhlly inform his attorney of
the facts. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)
("Sound legal advice or advocacy depends on the attorney being
fully informed by the client.").
c. Comment: The attorney-client privilege is predicated on
confidentiality. If a client asks for legal analysis that is not
confidential-e.g., a brief that will be filed in court-that final
analysis is certainly not privileged. Also, if a client shows
ambiguity or indifference to the expectation of confidentiality, the
communication may be found to not be privileged. At that point, it
becomes critical to determine whether the disclosed
communication was never privileged or whether the disclosure
constituted a waiver of privilege. It is also important to note that
an attorney, in contrast to a certified public accountant ("CPA"),
has an ethical duty to keep client communications confidential.
See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6.
2. Work Product
a. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) Description: Documents and tangible
things prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial by or for a party
or a party's representative are protected unless the other party
demonstrates need of such items to prepare his case, or the other
party is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent.
b. Purpose: The work product protection promotes uninhibited,
thorough trial preparation to ensure that the other party does not
seek to win "on wits borrowed from the adversary." Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
c. Comment: The work product protection is predicated on
preventing the accrual of an unfair advantage to the party's
opponent. As such, the work product protection is not necessarily
waived if work product is disclosed to a third-party other than an
opponent. Even if a waiver occurs, courts often define the scope of
the waiver narrowly.
3. Tax Advisor Privilege
a. IRC § 7525: The communications that a taxpayer has with a
federally authorized tax practitioner (e.g., accountant, enrolled
agent) that would be covered by the attorney-client privilege if
they had been with an attorney are privileged, but only in civil tax
proceedings (e.g., not SEC or crim'ial tax proceedings), and not if
the communications are made in connection with the promotion of
a corporate tax shelter as defined in IRC § 6662.
b. Purpose: The tax advisor privilege provides that the right to
privilege regarding tax advice before the Internal Revenue Service
does not depend on the type of advisor.
c. Comment: Whether a communication is subject to the tax advisor
privilege depends on whether the analogous elements of the
privilege are met. For instance, the communication must be made
in the course of seeking tax advice, not accounting advice or return
preparation services. Similarly, the client must have a reasonable
expectation of confidentiality, which can often be highly
problematic if the tax advisor also acts as the client's CPA.
B. Modem Application of Privilege in Tax Cases
I The Kovel Doctrine: The attorney-client privilege will not be waived if
communications are made in front of a third-party expert who is serving as
an interpreter to facilitate confidential communications between the client
and the attorney. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J.).
a. Facts: Kovel was an accountant who was employed by a law firm,
which was representing a client under investigation by a grand
jury; the grand jury issued a subpoena demanding that Kovel
appear and testify; Kovel refused to testify on the ground that he
was employed by the law firm.
b. Holding: "[T]he presence of an accountant, whether hired by the
lawyer or by the client, while the client is relating a complicated
tax story to the lawyer, ought not destroy the privilege, any more
than would that of the linguist [serving as an interpreter]; the
presence of the accounting is necessary, or at least highly useful,
for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer
which the privilege is designed to permit." Id. at 922.
c. Comment: The so-called "Kovel doctrine" has been widely
accepted and applied to experts other than accountants who act as
interpreters to facilitate communications relating to a client's
seeking of legal advice. However, the court in Kovel also made
clear that, if what is sought is the advice of the accountant rather
than the lawyer, no attorney-client privilege exists. Id. Attempts
by parties to stretch the Kovel doctrine to different factual
circumstances often fail. See, e.g., United States v. Ackert, 169
F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that an investment banker who
pitched a tax savings strategy to a potential corporate client was
not acting as an interpreter under Kovel).
2. Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A investment promoter who
discloses his attorney's tax opinion to potential third-party investors
waives any attorney-client privilege that may have existed between the
him and his attorney. See United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir.
1982).
a. Facts: Several investment promoters retained attorneys to provide
tax opinions regarding investments in coal leases and included
portions of the opinions in brochures and other promotional
materials distributed to potential third-party investors; a grand jury
issued several subpoenas seeking documents and testimony from
the attorneys; the promoters intervened and sought to assert the
attorney-client privilege.
b. Holding: Although expressing doubt that communications were
made to obtain legal advice, the Fourth Circuit held that any
asserted privilege was waived because the success of the
promoters' business venture depended on convincing the potential
investors that the claimed tax benefits would be sustained. Id. at
1073. The court held that any attorney-client privilege with
respect to the opinions and communications made in the process of
obtaining the opinions was waived. Id.
c. Comment: The court in Jones suggested that an investment
promoter who is not seeking advice regarding his own tax
consequences may not even be seeking legal advice in obtaining a
tax opinion from his attorney. Although reasonable minds might
differ about this suggested conclusion, the court's essential holding
that the any possibly privilege that existed was waived seems
beyond question. The court's holding is consistent with the often
stated axiom that the taxpayer cannot use the privilege as both a
"sword and a shield." In other words, to the extent that the
taxpayer affirmatively discloses legal advice to gain a benefit (e.g.,
interest from an investor or an advice of counsel defense), the
taxpayer will be required to disclose all communications relating to
that advice to ensure that the taxpayer has not selectively disclosed
only the favorable aspects of the advice received. See In re
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding that a company that disclosed tax advice received
from law firms in proxy statement related to a merger had waived
the attorney-client privilege with respect to that advice).
3. Tax Accrual Workpapers: United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805 (1984).
a. Facts: A CPA firm was responsible for reviewing the taxpayer-
corporation's financial statements as required by federal securities
laws; in the course of the review, the CPA firm verified the
statement of contingent tax liabilities, and in doing so prepared tax
accrual workpapers relating to the evaluation of the reserves for
such liabilities; the Service issued summonses to the CPA firm
seeking all of its files, including the tax accrual workpapers; the
taxpayer instructed the CPA firm not to respond.
b. Holdings: Citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335
(1973), the Supreme Court held that "no confidential accountant-
client privilege exists." Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817. Further,
the Court held that the work product doctrine announced in
Hickman v. Taylor, supra, did not apply because of the differing
roles of attorney and CPA. "By certifying the public reports that
collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the independent
auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any
employment relationship with the client." Arthur Young, 465 U.S.
at 817-18.
c. Comment: The Supreme Court in Arthur Young noted that
guidelines issued by the Service during the course of the litigation
provided that the examiner should seek tax accrual workpapers
only in "unusual circumstances" and only as a "collateral source
for factual data." Id. at 821 n. 17. That policy was basically
unchanged until a recent administrative pronouncement discussed
infra. It is also important to note that if a taxpayer's CPA firm
reviews the legal memoranda concerning tax issues prepared by
attorneys, those memoranda are not privileged. United States v. El
Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (1982).
4. The "In Anticipation of Litigation" Requirement for Work Product: A tax
memorandum written before a transaction occurs may qualify for the work
product protection if it was prepared "because of' anticipated litigation.
See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).
a. Facts: Adlman was an attorney and the Vice President for Taxes at
the taxpayer-corporation; the corporation was contemplating
undertaking a transaction that would generate a $289 million loss
for tax purposes; Adlman engaged an accountant at Arthur
Andersen to write a memorandum evaluating statutes, regulations
and cases, proposing theories and strategies for the taxpayer to
adopt in response to a likely challenge by the Service, and making
predictions about the likely outcome of litigation; during an
examination, the Service issued a summons seeking the
memorandum.
b. Holdings: In the first opinion, the court held that the fact that the
memorandum was produced before the transaction giving rise to
the claimed loss occurred was not dispositive of whether the
memorandum was prepared "in anticipation of litigation." 68 F.3d
at 1501. In the second opinion, the court rejected the argument
that the memorandum must have been prepared "primarily in
anticipation of litigation" (a standard adopted in some circuits) to
qualify for work product protection, and held that the
memorandum can qualify for such protection if it was prepared
"because of litigation." 134 F.3d at
c. Comment: The court in Adlman II indicated that the "because of'
standard applied in that case "withholds protection from
documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or
that would have been created in essentially similar form
irrespective of the [anticipated] litigation." Id. It is unclear from
the court's opinion which types of tax memoranda or opinions
might be viewed as prepared in the ordinary course of business and
which might be viewed as meeting the "because of' standard.
5. Selective Waiver: Although one court of appeals has held that disclosure
to one government agency does not waive the privilege, the vast majority
of circuits hold that any disclosure to a third party waives the attorney-
client privilege as to all third parties. See, e.g., United States v.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997)
(discussing the cases and applying the majority rule).
a. Facts: During an examination, the Service requested from MIT
legal bills and minutes of board and committee meetings; MIT
responded by providing redacted copies; after MIT refused to
supply the documents without redactions, the Service requested the
same documents from the auditing arm of the Department of
Defense, which had conducted an audit of defense contracts with
MIT and had obtained the documents without redactions; the
Defense Department declined to provide the documents, citing
internal policy; the IRS then summoned the documents from MIT.
b. Holding: The court declined to adopt a rule that would permit
selective disclosure to one agency without waiving the privilege to
other third parties, stating that such an approach would require "a
new set of difficult line-drawing exercises that would consume
time and increase uncertainty." Id. at 685.
c. Comment: The only case to uphold the selective waiver rule was
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.
1978) (en banc).
6. Dual-Purpose Documents: If a lawyer-accountant creates documents that
serve both legal and accounting purposes, the attorney-client privilege and
attorney work product protection do not apply. See United States v.
Frederick, 182 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999).
a. Facts: Frederick was an attorney and an accountant who prepared
federal income tax returns for the taxpayer-couple and represented
the taxpayers on audit; the Service summoned documents from
Frederick and he withheld many on the grounds of attorney-client
privilege and attorney work product; the documents included draft
tax returns, worksheets reflecting financial data and calculations,
and memos regarding compiling information to respond to the
Service's requests for information.
b. Holding: The court resolved the privilege issue by focusing on
whether the documents reflected "accountants' work" (e.g.,
evaluating financial data and making tax calculations, or verifying
numbers) or "attorneys' work" (e.g., evaluating issues of statutory
construction or case law). 182 F.3d at 502. Because there was no
evidence that Frederick was doing attorneys' work, the court held
that neither of the privileges apply. Id.
c. Comment: Although holding that no privilege existed, the court
rejected the government's argument that there was no issue of
privilege to the extent that the information was transmitted to a tax
return preparer with the expectation of it being relayed to the
Service. The court stated: "It cannot be assumed that everything
transmitted to [Frederick] by the taxpayer was intended to assist
him in his tax-preparation function... rather than in his legal-
representation function." Id. at 500-01. The court also rejected
the government's argument that numerical information can never
fall within the attorney-client or work product privileges. Id. at
501. Finally, although the tax advisor privilege under IRC § 7525
was not applicable to the documents at issue, the court noted that
"[n]othing in the new statute suggests that these non-lawyer
practitioners are entitled to privilege when they are doing other
than lawyers' work." 182 F.2d at 502.
C. Recent Cases and an Administrative Pronouncement from the Tax Shelter Wars
I1. Revisiting the Tax Accrual Workpapers Policy: In 2002, the IRS
announced that it was revising the policy (referred to in Arthur Young,
supra) concerning when revenue agents will request tax accrual or other
financial audit workpapers relating to the tax reserve for deferred tax
liabilities and to footnotes disclosing contingent tax liabilities appearing
on audited financial statements. See Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27
I.R.B. 72. In particular, revenue agents may request tax accrual
workpapers or other similar workpapers in the course of examining any
tax return filed on or after July 1, 2002 that claims any tax benefit arising
out of a transaction that the IRS has determined to be a listed transaction at
the time of the request.
a. General Rule If Disclosed: If the listed transaction was disclosed,
the IRS will routinely request only tax accrual and other similar
workpapers that relate to the transaction.
b. Other Circumstances: All such workpapers, however, will be
requested, in the event that either, (i) a listed transaction was not
disclosed on a return claiming benefits from such a transaction, (ii)
multiple listed transactions were claimed on a return (regardless of
disclosure), or (ii) there are reported financial irregularities (such
as those requiring a restatement of earnings) in connection with a
return claiming tax benefits from a listed transaction.
c. Comment: The Service has repeatedly indicated that it considers
the changed policy regarding tax accrual workpapers to be a
critical instrument in the war on tax shelters. However, as long as
a taxpayer does not engage in a listed transaction, the new policy
would not appear to be applicable. Of course, sometimes a
taxpayer engages in a transaction that, though not a listed
transaction at the time, becomes listed later. Also, if a taxpayer
does engage in a listed transaction, the new policy can be avoided
by claiming the tax benefits on an amended return.
2. Subiect Matter Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege: Long-Term Capital
Holdings v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1139 (D. Conn. 2003).
a. Facts: The taxpayer first engaged a law firm to determine the tax
basis in certain property that would be contributed to a partnership;
the taxpayer later engaged a different law firm to consider a
subsequent transaction involving the same property; during an
examination, the taxpayer turned over the basis opinion issued by
the first law firm to the Service; the Service then argued that the
disclosure of the first opinion constituted a subject matter waiver
and required the second opinion to also be disclosed; the Service
also argued that the taxpayer had waived the privilege by invoking
the advice of counsel defense in response to the assertion of
penalties, and that the disclosure to its accountant of the fact it
received favorable advice from its attorneys waived the privilege.
b. Holdings: The court held that the basis opinion was not privileged
because the taxpayer did not intend to keep the opinion
confidential but rather intended that the opinion would serve as
part of the books and records that would be available for the
Service to review. After an in camera review, the court also found
that the subject matter of the basis opinion was distinct from the
subject matter of the second opinion. Further, the court held that it
was premature for the government to argue that the taxpayer was
asserting the advice of counsel defense, and that, under the fairness
doctrine, the only part of the second opinion that had been waived
was the general conclusion (i.e., that it was "more likely than not"
that the loss could be taken) that was conveyed to the account.
c. Comment: The court in Long-Term Capital Holdings correctly
recognized that not all legal opinions are confidential and,
therefore, intended to be privileged. It would be advantageous to
make the fact that such an opinion is not confidential clear,
however, so that the Service cannot argue that the disclosure of
such an opinion constitutes a subject matter waiver. (This is an
approach that is often taken whether a taxpayer's financial auditors
demand written analysis from counsel.) The court also made clear
that the fairness doctrine only applies where the extra-judicial
disclosure of an attorney-client communication is "subsequently
used by the client in a judicial proceeding." see In re Von Bulow,
828 F.2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987). Under such circumstances, such
disclosure "does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed
portions of the communication." Id. The fairness doctrine is likely
to play an interesting role in future tax cases involving privilege
disputes.
3. Attorney-Client Relationship and Scope of the Tax Advisor Privilege:
John Doe #1 v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp.2d 627 (W.D.N.C. 2003)
a. Facts: A number of taxpayers were referred to a law firm by a
financial institution; the law firm provided the taxpayers with a
package containing a description of a proposed transaction and
memorandum regarding the potential tax consequences; after the
Service summoned the bank for documents related to the
transactions, the taxpayers filed suit to prevent disclosure by
asserting the attorney-client privilege and the tax advisor privilege
under IRC § 7525.
b. Holdings: The court held that no attorney-client relationship
existed because the law firm merely sold a package to the
taxpayers, who themselves never appeared to have so much as a
conversation with an attorney at the law firm. 268 F.Supp.2d at
634. The court also held that the tax advisor privilege did not
apply because the case did not constitute a civil tax proceeding
(i.e., the suit was between the taxpayers and the bank; the Service
was not a party).
c. Comment: This case is similar to the Fourth Circuit's previous
decision in Jones, supra, in that the court refused to sustain a claim
of privilege where tax opinions were used as a marketing device.
It is also similar to the recently decided United States v. KPMG
LLP, 316 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.D.C. 2004), in which the court rejected
privilege assertions in similar circumstances, stating at one point:
"In fact, when examined as a group, the letters appear to be
nothing more than an orchestrated extension of KPMG's marketing
machine." The court in Wachovia also pointed out a significant
limitation on the tax advisor privilege-i.e., that it does not apply
outside civil tax proceedings. Interestingly, the court also found in
the alternative that the tax advisor privilege would not apply
because the tax opinions were distributed in connection with the
promotion of tax shelters involving corporations (the proposed
transaction involved the creation of a corporation), although the
relevant statutory language could be read to require that the
investor in such a tax shelter be a corporation. See IRC § 7525(b).
4. Identity Privilege and IRC § 7525: United States. v. BDO Seidman, 337
F.3d 802 (2003).
a. Facts: The Service summonsed document relating to the
accounting firm BDO Seidman's compliance with list-keeping and
registration requirements for potentially abusive tax shelters under
IRC §§ 6111 and 6112; the clients of BDO sought to intervene to
assert the tax advisor privilege under IRC § 7525.
b. Holdings: The court held that the tax advisor privilege is no
broader than the attorney-client privilege. 337 F3d at 810. The
court also held that the so-called "identity privilege," which is an
exception to the general rule that the client's identity is not
privileged, did not apply because the Service was unaware of the
substantive content of the discussions between the clients and
BDO. Id. at 812. Further, the court noted that the clients'
participation in the potentially abusive tax shelters is information
required to be disclosed under IRC §§ 6111 and 6112, and,
therefore, the clients had no expectation of confidentiality in the
communications regarding such participation with BDO. 337 F.3d
at 812.
c. Comment: The court noted that the identity privilege applies only
"in the rare circumstance when so much of an actual confidential
communication has been disclosed already that merely identifying
the client with effectively disclose the communication." Id. at 810.
In the tax arena, the typical situation in which this arises is when a
taxpayer has made a voluntary disclosure to avoid criminal
prosecution.
1H. Circular 230 Revisions and Heightened Focus on Enforcement
A. Background: Circular 230, 31 C.F.R., pt. 10, governs practice before the Internal
Revenue Service. The ethics rules imposed on practicing attorneys by Circular
230 are in addition to those imposed by state bars and courts. This outline focuses
only on selected rules.
I1. Practitioner Definition: "Practitioner" is defined as attorneys, CPAs,
enrolled agents or enrolled actuaries. 31 C.F.R., pt. 10, §§ 10.2(e) and
10.3(a)-(d).
2. Practice Definition: "Practice before" the Service is defined as "all
matters connected with a presentation to the [Service] or any of its officers
or employees relating to a taxpayer's rights, privileges, or liabilities under
laws or regulations administered by the [Service]. Such presentations
include, but are not limited to, preparing and filing documents,
corresponding and communicating with the [Service], and representing a
client at conferences, hearings, and meetings." 31 C.F.R., pt. 10,
§ 10.2(d). Traditionally, any representation that required the practitioner
to provide an executed power of attorney to the relevant Service personnel
was viewed as constituting practice before the Service.
3. General Reporting Standard for Return Positions: A practitioner may not
advise with respect to a return position unless there is a realistic possibility
(i.e., a one-in-three chance) that the position will be sustained on the
merits, unless the position is not frivolous and the practitioner informs the
client of the likelihood of penalties. 31 C.F.R., pt. 10, § 10.34(a)-
4. Standards for Tax Shelter Marketing Opinions: In the 1980s, Circular 230
was amended to provide standards for practitioner issuing "marketing"
opinions for tax shelters. These standards were designed to aid in
combating the tax shelters that proliferated during that time. Those tax
shelters typically involved promoters who marketed partnership interests
to individual investors, who sought deduction or credits that could shelter
as much unrelated income as possible with as little investment as possible.
The tax shelter marketing opinion standards are still in force. See 31
C.F.R., pt. 10, § 10.33.
B. Recent History and Developments
1. 2001 Proposed Revisions: In February 2001, Treasury issued proposed
revisions to Circular 230 that would have, among other things, added
standards for practitioners issuing "more likely than not" opinions. These
standards of practice were designed to aid in combating corporate and
individual tax shelters that have been proliferating in more recent years.
Comments on the proposed regulations were received, but the proposed
regulations were never finalized.
2. 2003 Proposed Revisions: On December 29, 2003, Treasury issued new
proposed revisions to Circular 230. See 68 Fed. Reg. 75,186. As
discussed further below, the new proposed regulations focus on four areas:
a. Describing "best practices" for all practitioners
b. Provide standards applicable to marketed tax shelter opinions and
more likely than not tax shelter opinions
c. Provide procedures for ensuring compliance with the standards
applicable to tax shelter opinions
d. Provide for advisory committees to the Office of Professional
Responsibility
3. Recent Appointment: On the same day, the Service also announced that a
new Director of the Office of Professional Responsibility was being
appointed, Cono Namorato. His prior experience includes white-collar
criminal defense work, and public service as the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for Criminal Tax.
C. 2003 Proposed Revisions to Circular 230: The following is a summary of
selected provisions of the 2003 proposed revisions to Circular 230. See 68 Fed.
Reg. 75,186.
1. Best Practices: The best practices standards proposed apply to all
practitioners in providing clients representation. These standards include:
a. Communicating clearly regarding the terms of the engagement and
the form and scope of the advice rendered;
b. Establishing the relevant facts, including the reasonableness of any
assumption or representations;
c. Relating applicable law, including judicial doctrines, to the
relevant facts;
d. Arriving at a conclusion supported by the law and facts;
e. Advising the clients of the import of the conclusions;
f. Acting fairly and with integrity in practice before the IRS.
2. Scope of Tax Shelter Opinions: The tax shelter opinions standards apply
to both marketed and more likely than not tax shelter opinions.
a. The applicable definition of a tax shelter is the definition under the
accuracy related penalty. See Sec. 6662. Because the accuracy
related penalty defines a tax shelter broadly as any transaction that
involves a significant purpose to avoid tax, many commentators
have criticized as unworkable and unwarranted the wide scope of
the proposed tax shelter opinion standards.
b. "Marketed tax shelter opinions" are those used by third persons in
promoting, marketing, or recommending the tax shelter to one or
more taxpayers.
c. "More likely than not tax shelter opinions" are opinions that reach
a conclusion that there is at least a greater than 50 percent chance
that one or more material federal tax issues would be resolved in
the taxpayer's favor.
d. Preliminary advice provided pursuant to an engagement in which
the practitioner is expected to later provide an opinion that satisfies
the more likely than not tax shelter opinion standards is excluded.
3. Tax Shelter Opinion Standards: Under the tax shelter opinion standards:
a. Practitioners must use reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain
the facts (including future events) that are relevant. The opinion
must identify and consider all relevant facts and not rely on any
unreasonable factual assumptions or representations.
b. Practitioners must relate the applicable law (including judicial
doctrines) to the relevant facts and not rely on any unreasonable
legal assumptions, representations or conclusions.
c. Practitioners must generally consider all material federal tax issues
and reach a conclusion with respect to each issue. If the
practitioner considers less than all material federal tax issues,
certain requirements must be met.
d. Practitioners must provide an overall conclusion as to the tax
shelter item (or items) and the reasons for that conclusion, or state
that the practitioner is unable to reach such a conclusion and
describe the reasons.
e. Practitioners must be knowledgeable in all of the aspects of federal
tax law relevant to the opinion being rendered. If not, the
practitioner may rely on the opinion of another practitioner with
respect to these issues unless the practitioner knows or should
know that such opinion should not be relied on.
4. Required Disclosures: The tax shelter opinion standards also require
certain disclosures at the beginning of marketed tax shelter opinions,
limited scope opinions, and opinions that fail to reach a conclusion at a
confidence level of at least more likely than not.
a. Practitioners must disclose if there is compensation arrangement
with respect to the promotion, marketing or recommending of a tax
shelter, or if there is a referral agreement between the practitioner
and any person engaged in marketing the tax shelter.
b. Practitioners must disclose that a marketed opinion may not be
sufficient for purposes of avoiding the accuracy related penalty,
and that taxpayers should seek advice from their own advisors.
c. Practitioners must disclose in a limited scope opinion that
additional issues may exist that could affect the federal tax
treatment of the tax shelter, and that such an opinion cannot be
used for accuracy related penalty purposes.
d. Practitioners must disclose in an opinion that fails to reach a more
likely than not opinion with respect to any material federal tax
issue that the opinion cannot be used for accuracy related penalty
purposes.
5. Procedures to Ensure Compliance: The procedures to ensure compliance
provide standards to ensure compliance within a practitioner's firm with
the best practices and tax shelter opinions provisions of Circular 230.
a. Practitioners with responsibility for overseeing a firm's practice
before the IRS should take reasonable steps that the firm has
adequate procedures in effect to ensure that all members,
associates and employees comply with the best practices standards.
b. Practitioners With principal authority and responsibility for
overseeing a firm's practice of providing advice concerning federal
tax issues must take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has
adequate procedures in effect to ensure that all members,
associates and employees comply with the tax s, elter opinion
standards. A practitioner will be subject to discipline under this
section if:
i. The practitioner through willfulness, recklessness or
gross incompetence does not take such reasonable
steps, and one or more members, associates or
employees are, or have, engaged in a pattern of practice
of failing to comply with the tax shelter opinion
standards.
ii. The practitioner knows or has reason to know that any
members, associates or employees have engaged in
practice that does not comply with those standards, and
the practitioner, through willfulness, recklessness, or
gross incompetence, fails to take prompt action to
correct the noncompliance.
6. Advisory Committees on the Integrity of Tax Professionals: The Director
of the Office of Professional Responsibility may establish one or more
advisory committees composed of at least five individuals authorized to
practice before the IRS to review and make recommendations regarding
professional standards and whether a practitioner may have violated the
best practices or tax shelter opinion standards.
D. 2004 Proposed Legislation Regarding Treasury Department Authorization: There
have been anecdotal reports through the years to the effect that, whenever the
Director of Practice charged practitioners with violating the Circular 230 opinion
standards, the administrative law judge would dismiss the cases on ground that
writing opinions did not constitute "practice before" the Service. To remedy this
problem, and provide further explicit authorization to regulate practice before the
Service, Congress has recently proposed legislation.
1. The statute that authorizes the issuance of Circular 230 grants authority to
the Secretary of the Treasury to "regulate the practice of representatives of
persons before the Department of the Treasury." 31 U.S.C. § 330(a).
2. The proposed legislation would amend the statute to provide that
"[n]othing in this section or in any other provision of law shall be
construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to impose
standards applicable to the rendering of written advice with respect to any
entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement,
which is of a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for
tax avoidance or evasion." H.R. 4520, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., § 622(b);
see also S. 1637, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., § 414(b).
3. In addition, the proposed legislation would also explicitly provide
authorization for the Secretary to censure a practitioner, and to impose a
monetary penalty on a practitioner, or the practitioner's firm if it knew or
should have known of the improper conduct. H.R. 4520, 108th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 622(a) see also S. 1637, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., § 414(a). The
penalty would be limited to an amount that does not exceed the gross
income derived from the improper conduct. H.R. 4520, 108th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 622(a); see also S. 1637, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., § 414(a).
E. Recent Case Implicating Circular 230 Issues: In Long-Term Capital Holdings v.
United States, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17,159 (August 27, 2004), the court held
that the taxpayer was not entitled to a claimed loss and that, for several reasons,
the taxpayer was not entitled to rely on a "should" opinion from a law firm as a
defense to penalties. In doing so, the court concluded, among other things, that
the opinion was not written as of the date that the tax return was filed (i.e., the law
firm provided only an oral opinion at that time, which was later followed up by a
written opinion), and that the opinion did not meet the minimal standards required
for an advice of counsel defense under IRC § 6664. It seems likely that the court
would not have found that the opinion met the new standards (not yet applicable)
under the proposed revisions to Circular 230.
